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    Violence, structured through institutions of feud and warfare, is perhaps the most 
important formative element in Middle Eastern segmentary lineage societies.  As 
organizations of "disequilibrium in equilibrium"i these societies become coherent in 
relations of lineage opposition.  In other words, "The tribe is not organised except for 
offence and defence; except in war and in matters ultimately connected with war, the 
licence of individual freewill is absolutely uncontrolled."ii 
    The ideal form of the patrilineal segmentary lineage system unites groups and 
individuals through descent from a common male ancestor.  Those who share an ancestor 
are obliged by the tie of blood to defend one another against outsiders or more distant 
relatives.  In theory, coalitions in opposition can unite thousands, or even millions, of 
putative lineal relatives in warfare, as the British, French and, more recently, Soviet 
colonialists have discovered.  The same mechanism operates as well at the very lowest 
level of genealogy, grouping brothers against patrilateral parallel cousins.  In its ideal 
form the system has a boundless capacity for fusion and fission, "since even the nuclear 
family is a miniature of the larger social system."iii 
     But the ideal pattern in which every segment at every level is structurally equivalent is 
mitigated in reality by differentiation in the vital matters of revenge and warfare.  Among 
the Bedouin of Cyrenaica, for example, the nuclear family is not responsible for blood 
vengeance.  That duty  falls upon the co-resident lineage segment which is related to the 
victim up to the fourth or fifth ascending generation.  Likewise, the members of this 
group share blood money and are held culpable for any homicide committed by a 
member.iv  More inclusive segments function only as landholding units and rarely, if 
ever, unite in blood disputes, while lineage groups within the co-resident segment appear 
to fission rather than fight.  A similar distinction is seen in Iraq.v  In fact, violence against 
close agnatic relatives is generally disallowed in Middle Eastern societies, though the rule 
is sometimes very laxly observed, as among the Berbers of the Rif where "vengeance 
killings within agnatic lineage groups…occurred too often simply to be dismissed as 
exceptions to the rule."vi 
     Among the Pukhtun people of Swat in Northern Pakistan violence is more highly 
structured than in the cases reported elsewhere in the Middle East.  The Pukhtun of Swat 
are the descendants of nomads who conquered the region some 400 years ago, reducing 
the local inhabitants to helots.  The Pukhtun themselves became sedentary 
agriculturalists, relying on their own labor and that of their dependents to produce 
subsistence crops of rice, wheat, and later, maize.  Land now is scarce, but this problem 
appears to be fairly recent.  Traditionally, the region was one of "ordered anarchy" with 
numerous and ephemeral small-scale leaders in every village, each deriving his position 
from personal ability and strength.  Early in the twentieth century a central government 
was superimposed ;  over this structure of shifting alliances,vii but in the last decade this 
government has weakened considerably, allowing the old segmentary system to reassert 
itself.viii 
     Within this setting relations between groups and between individuals are structured in 
large measure by degrees of violence.  Inside the nuclear family, men and women 
confront one another in a continuous struggle for dominance.  Women, as incoming 
wives, seek to retain their lineage honor and to control their new home.  For men, the task 
is to subdue the wife or, failing that, to humiliate her.  The husband has the trump card in 
this battle, since he can take a second wife, thereby shaming the first and all her lineage.  
The woman's response may be violent, as she is not allowed divorce.  Overt fighting, as 
well as covert use of magical spells against her rival, are the woman's weapons.  Should 
she fail to drive out her co-wife, she may vindicate herself by poisoning her husband, and 
men with two wives who die of "cholera" are often rumored to have been murdered, 
although public accusations are rarely made. 
     On their side, men are permitted and encouraged to beat their wives regularly.  Only if 
bones are broken is a woman allowed to flee to her family, and even then she must return 
to her husband after a year or so.  Outright murder of  wives, however, is very 
uncommon, since her lineage would avenge her death.  The few cases of wife murder 
involved women without close male relatives.  But there is a caveat to the rule of lineage 
vengeance for the death of a lineage woman; if the woman has been sexually 
promiscuous or acted in a manner which is scandalous, her own patriline will reject and 
even shoot her.  (For more complete data on Pukhtun marriage see Lindholm & 
Lindholm 1979.) 
     Violence in the nuclear family is not limited to husband and wife.  Fathers, sons, and 
brothers have relations of hostility, despite the formal respect and service the younger 
must always offer the elder.  In a relationship typical of patrilineal society,ix brothers are 
rivals for the father's land and squabble among themselves and with the father for a share.  
These conflicts, though causing ill-feeling, do not often end in real fighting because a 
man's brothers and father are his most certain allies in any outside clash and it would be 
self-defeating to kill them.  As an example, there is one case within recent memory of my 
informants where a man did kill his brother.  The motive was greed for the brother's 
wealth and lust for the brother's wife, who was the killer's accomplice.  The killer 
inherited both and was safe from revenge since he himself was the closest relative of the 
murdered man.  But without allies he was unable to protect his gains, and a local strong 
man deprived him of his property and his new wife, and drove him from the village. 
     Killings of fathers and sons are more frequent than killings of brothers.  Two fathers 
were reportedly killed by their sons in recent memory, and there was an attempt by a son 
to kill his father during the time of fieldwork.  The attempt failed, and the son is presently 
in jail on his father's complaint.  In another case during the fieldwork, a large landlord 
shot and killed his son because the son had refused to give a share of his rice harvest to 
the father's mother, the victim's own grandmother.  The wife of the dead man asked that 
the killer be prosecuted, but her brothers-in-law pressed her to drop the case, which she 
was obliged to do.  These cases were all over land, but sexual jealousy and seduction of 
wives within the extended family also can cause murder, as Ahmed notes.x 
     Violence within the family is thus of two types:  that directed towards affines and that 
directed towards agnates.  The former is part of a larger pattern of lineage enmity which 
is acted out in the hostile relationship of husband and wife and may lead to a feud if the 
wife is killed without sufficient cause.  The latter derives from internal rivalry over 
property and women and may also escalate to murder, but does not involve revenge, since 
the killing has been committed by the closest possible agnate. 
     The next level of violence is between close patrilateral parallel cousins.  This is the 
most deadly relationship in Swat.  Of the seventeen killings of men by men which I 
recorded during fieldwork, seven were killings either of close patrilateral parallel cousins 
or of the  servants of these cousins.  In addition, there were numerous fights between 
cousins which ended short of killing.  The tension between cousins is such that the 
kinship term of reference, tarbur, is synonymous with "enemy."xi  The enmity between 
cousins derives from their claims to the land of their common grandfather.  Their 
holdings are adjacent, and each will try to push the holdings of the other back by trickery 
or force.  As an example, two cousins had neighboring plots.  The cousin whose field was 
more distant from the village walked to his field on an ancient pathway which verged on 
the plot of his tarbur.  There was a simmering dispute over the right to this narrow path 
which ended in gunfight and the death of one of the men's sons. 
     Disputes express or question dominance and power.  It is an axiom among the 
Pukhtun that tarbur do not fear one another.  A man whose cousin has become wealthy 
and powerful will feel pressure to pick a fight with him to display his own strength.  The 
most devastating feud ongoing during fieldwork was one which began with a boy's 
refusal to let his second cousin play soccer with him.  This insult led to a fight which 
spread to the boys' fathers.  At the close of the fieldwork three men were dead and the 
fields of both families had either been sold for weapons or else left fallow as the 
remaining men sought to eliminate their rivals. 
     Among elite Pukhtun who have a claim to local leadership, a feud must be carried 
through to its bitter conclusion, which usually entails the ruin of all the partic ipants.xii   
Outsiders, who are jealous of a dominant family, will sometimes try to precipitate such a 
feud.  In one village, unauthorized use of a room in the men's house by some young men 
for a rendezvous with a prostitute led to a beating by the owner of the room, who was the 
uncle (FFBS) of the young men.  This was followed by a series of escalating retaliatory 
actions, culminating in the jailing of one of the young men.  Soon thereafter, the uncle's 
valuable stand of apple tree saplings was cut down in the middle of the night.  The village 
waited to see what the uncle, a notoriously bad-tempered man, would do, but after 
consultation with his brothers, he decided to do nothing.  "Thank Allah, I have many 
enemies," he told me, "they would like to see me ruined in a fight with my tarbur.  
Perhaps these enemies cut down my trees."  This case exemplifies a repeated motif in 
Swati politics; that is, the role of the manipulatory third party. 
      Although the elite must maintain a feud to the  last man, less powerful lineages may 
allow themselves to be pressured to reach a settlement.  In the case of the cousins feuding 
over the pathway, the village jirga (council of elders from elite families) prevailed on the 
father of the dead boy to accept a blood payment and forswear revenge against his tarbur.  
The opponents in this case were clients of local Pukhtun patrons who feared that they 
might be drawn into an escalating conflict.  They therefore pressed their clients to accept 
a truce.  A similar case concerned two landless cousins employed by rival Pukhtun as 
tenant farmers on adjoining strips of land.  A fight between the client families ended in 
the death of two men, but the patrons forced a reconciliation. 
     It is important for the jirga to reach a compromise in cases involving poor clients 
since the honor of the patron is at stake.  Even in fights which have nothing to do with his 
interests, a patron is obliged to enter the fight on his client's behalf in order to keep his 
credibility as a leader.  Fights between servants, like fights between children, can lead to 
destructive battles between Pukhtun families.  Every effort, therefore, is made to arbitrate 
fights among clients. 
     Barth (1959a) and Ahmed (1976) provide extensive discussions of the role of so-
called saints in mediating disputes in Swat.  My data suggest that such figures, who are 
generally non-Pukhtun claiming a religious heritage, do not intervene in disputes within a 
village between cousins.  If the disputants are poor or weak, then the village jirga will try 
to mediate; if the participants are Pukhtun, particularly if they are elite Pukhtun with 
pretensions to leadership, no mediation is attempted.  It is considered inevitable that the 
fight will end in the death or exile of one family and the financial ruin of the other.  
Saints, it seems, mediate in disputes which go beyond the village limits. 
     Unlike the Berbers cited by Hart (1970), the Pukhtun do not consider violence 
between near patrilineal relatives to be abnormal.  Furthermore, in contradistinction to the 
cases considered by Fernea (1970) and Peters (1960), Swat Pukhtun take revenge directly 
on the man who committed the murder and perhaps, after he has been killed, on his sons 
and father as well.  The notion of group responsibility is not developed, and retaliation, 
even in cases which do not involve tarbur, is directed to specific individuals.  Pukhtun 
will wait many years to take revenge on a particular person.  For example, a man was 
killed in a fight in the early 1950s.  His killer offered the victim's family blood money, 
which was accepted.  But for a Pukhtun, blood money, or even the donation of a woman, 
is never adequate compensation for death.  Blood demands blood.  Thus, after nearly 
thirty years, the son of the murdered man killed his father's killer while the old man was 
lying, helpless and immobile, in a hospital bedxiii.  This act, which led to the permanent 
exile of the killer, was much praised by the Pukhtun men. 
      It is evident from the above history that vengeance need not involve daring.  Rather, it 
is accomplished by stealth or betrayal.  Courage is not in the act of killing so much as it is 
in the willingness to take the ruinous consequences for the sake of cleansing one's honor. 
     Rivalry between cousins and the focusing of revenge on individuals and nuclear 
families instead of on larger groups limits the escalation of blood feuds in Swat.  Other 
forms of violence, however, involve more inclusive groups both inside and outside the 
village. 
     All Swati villages are divided into neighborhoods (palao).  A very small village may 
have only one palao, but most have three.  Two of the palao are generally larger and 
more powerful than the third.  Each neighborhood in turn is subdivided into tul, or wards, 
also usually three in number.  These tul are dominated by and named after a particular 
leader who, with his close relatives and clients, heads a faction which must be 
represented in village jirgas.  The tuls in a neighborhood, though in opposition, can join 
together in action against another palao.  Of course, all is not peaceful within the tul 
either, as tarbur compete with one another for leadership and prestige.  Thus the political 
organization of the village is perhaps best conceived as small circles of patrilineal kin, 
residing near one another, and acting together in opposition to other circles of the same 
scale. 
     Complementing and complicating the formal segmentary system is a dualistic party 
structure (dullah) which cross-cuts the tuls and palao.  It strongly resembles the liff 
alliances of the Berbers.xiv  Gellner (1969:67) doubts the existence of the liff at the 
village level, and claims the system functions, if it functions at all, between villages.  
Hart (1970:42-45) also sees the liff working primarily to balance the uneven distribution 
of power within tribal units by means of external alliances.  Hexv notes that "'temporary' 
liff…operating within a clan, a subclan, or a local community, could and did shift and 
change."  The Pukhtun, like the Berbers, speak of the dual parties as if they were concrete 
entities; indeed, each individual sees the tribal world divided into those who are for and 
those who are against his party.  In Swat, the parties are named after their local leader's 
clan, so that the parties have different names throughout the valley.  Each village dullah 
connects with a web of alliances throughout the region so that a powerful leader will be 
able to name members of his party in 50 villages or more. 
     These parties are not formally structured.  They are simply a statement, couched in 
universal and abstract terms, of the fluid oppositions and alliances of individuals.  A man 
sees his party as a tool in his own personal struggle against his enemies, particularly his 
tarbur.  Barth (1959a:2) states that enmity between cousins takes precedence over 
segmentary merging in Swat; "the opposition between small, closely related segments 
persists in the wider context, and these segments unite with similar small  segments in a 
pattern of two party opposition, not in a merging series of descent segments."  In this 
Barth has reified individual strategy into a structural principle of the unity of patrilineal 
segments.  In actual fact, party alliances are set aside in cases of blood revenge.  No man 
would support the murderer of his tarbur under any circumstances, even if the killer were 
a long-time party ally.  The limited range of revenge rights obscures, but does not 
obliterate, the unity of blood groups in Swat.  While a man may not actively seek 
vengeance for a wrong done to a cousin, he certainly would not stand in the way of 
revenge being takenxvi because the tarbur  is  not only one's enemy but also, in the proper 
circumstances, a reliable support.  A man without tarbur stands naked to the assaults of 
genealogically more distant enemies, and while strong tarbur provoke jealousy they also 
evoke pride and confidence. 
     Barth's (1959b) overvaluation of the opposition between cousins results in a static 
picture of Pukhtun social structure; oppositions balance out in a no-win game as the 
manipulations and defections of players tend toward stalemate.  This long-term leveling 
process is institutionalized in the dyadic dullah system.  But in pursuing his analysis, 
Barth ignores the triadic patterning of palao and tul and the dialectical development of 
differential power relations institutionalized within these forms.  In the long run, Barth's 
picture of stalemate is accurate, but in the short run good players gain positions of 
dominance and prestige.  Obviously, some families become strong simply by out-
reproducing others; some men are particularly brave, intelligent, or Machiavellian; and 
some clans are lucky or skilled at manipulation.  Uneven development belies the picture 
of balance offered by Barth's concentration on the party system. 
     The mechanisms of party formation provide a processual view of Swati political 
process.  Certainly a man opposes his tarbur, but he often has several tarbur.  He has a 
choice of enemies and allies and joins or wars with his cousins according to his own 
advantage.  The shifting dyad covers a triadic form consisting of ego, his momentary 
allies and his momentary enemies.  This same pattern is found at every level of Swati 
society.  For example, although each village is divided into two parties, the party lines do 
not simply bisect the village.  Rather, one palao will mostly follow the party of its most 
able tul leader, a second palao will mostly support the rival party, while a third palao, 
weaker in numbers, will oscillate between the two sides, playing off the opponents and 
hoping they will exhaust themselves in the combat.  The same pattern is  repeated with 
the palaos themselves as the three tuls vie for dominance.  At a regional level, the motif 
again recurs.  Regions are usually made up of three "brother" clans; two strong and one 
weak, which are cross-cut by dullah alliances.  At all these levels the potential power of 
the weak but manipulative third party is evident,xvii and the role of the troublemaker, 
discussed earlier, is a structural concomitant of the Swati social order. 
     Within the village politically violent action is always possible but rarely occurs.  A 
murder, whatever the cause, leads to revenge.  As mentioned above, political alliances 
then drop away and the affair becomes one of feud between two nuclear families.  Much 
more likely in village politics was exile.  Should one family become overwhelmingly 
powerful, their disgruntled tarbur  would flee the village to find temporary refuge with a 
nearby ally.  The refugees would encourage their host to plan warfare on their home 
village in hopes of humbling their proud relatives. 
     Exile, while sometimes lengthy, was almost always impermanent.  The exiled party 
was never totally accepted by its hosts on the grounds that "a man who would betray his 
own kin would certainly betray us as well."  Furthermore, the exiles had no rights in land 
in their host's territory, while their claim to land within their own village continued in 
force.  Eventually, the exiles would tire of living on charity and return home to claim 
their patrimony.  Sometimes they had to return as supplicants, but more often they were 
invited back by their tarbur in order to strengthen the manpower of the village.  
Occasionally, the exiles returned as members of an invading army and used the strength 
of their new position as conquerors to settle old grievances. 
     Violence between villages varies according to the genealogical distance between 
them.  Villages which are closely related have a ritualized form of warfare which 
formerly occurred at the close of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting.  The villages 
were paired according to genealogical and spatial proximity — the two attributes are 
considered isomorphic in Swat—and the young men would meet in a field to fight with 
slingshots.  There were always a number of injuries and sometimes a death.  No revenge 
was taken for these fatalities, which were seen as accidental.  In these fights the youth of 
the whole village participated together regardless of party affiliation. 
     Fighting between more distantly related villages was considerably more violent and 
was known by the people themselves as jang (warfare).  Whereas ritual war was within 
the group of "brother" villages, real warfare was between "brothers."  It was to these 
more distant villages, who could wage real warfare, that exiles fled.  Fatalities in these 
wars could be quite high, as the fighting parties  rallied their allies and bodyguards for 
attacks on opposition strongholds  Deaths in such wars, however, did not involve revenge 
or even lasting enmity.  Conversely, killings committed by turncoat tarbur  who had 
joined the enemy were avenged.  For example, in the last great intervillage war (around 
1900) one ambitious man joined the village's enemies.  With his help, the enemy group 
invaded the exile's home village, and during the occupation, the traitor killed two of his 
cousin's bodyguards and destroyed a great deal of property.  Later, with the aid of allies 
and defections from the enemy, the defeated party regained strength and recaptured its 
home base, once again balancing the regional distribution of power.  The exile was 
banished by his allies, who did not want the responsibility of protecting him from 
vengeance.  He was obliged to return home and allow two of his sons to be killed in 
compensation for his crimes.  He accepted this punishment as just, rejoined the village 
jirga, and retained a position of prestige in the village.  His grandsons are presently 
among the most powerful men in their neighborhood.  It is significant that the exile's 
erstwhile allies were not held responsible for the deaths which occurred in this war.  Also 
noteworthy is the Swat attitude toward betrayal.  The exile, having failed to win power by 
manipulation within the village, took the risk of moving the conflict onto the intervillage 
arena.  His treachery was seen locally merely as a political ploy which failed and not as 
anything particularly reprehensible.  This matter-of-fact attitude toward betrayal, so 
difficult for the Westerner to understand, is simply a realistic acceptance of the 
structurally motivated individualism of Swati politics. 
     The causes of large-scale wars seem generally to have focused on exiles.  Men who 
had killed a tarbur or women who had shamed their husbands would flee to the 
protection of a powerful family, which was obliged to offer protection.  If this refuge was 
violated by enemies of the refugee, then the host might become involved in a feud with 
people who were remotely related to him.  Such an event could bring together very large 
lineage/village groups.xviii  Also, exiles could instigate a war by throwing themselves on 
the mercy of their host and demanding that he avenge any wrong which had been done 
them. 
     Of course, as Sillitoe (1978) notes, political leaders can manipulate situations to 
further their own political ambitions.  Ambitious and courageous men with aptitudes for 
strategy favored warfare since it increased their local authority and prestige.  The role of 
the protector, however is ambiguous and malleable.  He can choose to stress his place as 
mediator between the refugee and his or her pursuers.  As a supposedly disinterested 
outsider, he could try to work out some sort of settlement to end the situation amicably.  
Or, conversely, he could use the exile's complaints to justify beginning a war.  Then 
again, the ability of the host to use the situation for his own advantage is limited by 
external circumstance as well.  A  host who is reluctant to fight will be forced to it should 
the refugee be attacked, for instance. 
     The rewards of war at this level were primarily for renown.  Certainly there were 
material benefits of success, and Swati elders recall pillaging the fields of defeated 
villages.  But homes were never ransacked, and men forced into exile left their valuables 
in the care of local religious men with the full expectation of returning to reclaim them.  
Rather than wealth, the winner's prize was the carved columns to the loser's men's house, 
which were carried away as emblems of victory.  Successful warriors did not expect to 
hold on to their conquered territory, since their very success meant that former allies 
would defect, join the defeated group, and rebalance the system.  The end result of the 
several intervillage wars recorded was a "great name" for the war leaders and their 
families, but no apparent aggrandizement of their property. 
     It is in situations of intervillage war that the saintly class of religious mediators 
became arbitrators.  While the village jirga mediated disputes between non-elite within 
the village, and feuds between proud tarbur were left to run their tragic, but quite 
restricted, course, war between villages could not cease without the intervention of an 
external noncombatant saint, whose mediation allowed both sides to back off without 
undue loss of face.  The fact that these mediators were rewarded with land grants which 
lay between the potentially waring villages indicates both the primary role of the saints 
and the relative lack of land pressure during the era of warfare.  It is noteworthy that this 
land was reclaimed by strong Pukhtun clans several generations later when land pressure 
began to be felt.  This reclamation did not infringe on the property rights of anyone 
except the dispossessed saints and so did not lead to increased warfare.  Thus, by 
removing land from the tribal property and deeding it to weak saintly lineages, the 
Pukhtun, consciously or otherwise, provided themselves with a land reserve from which 
powerful lineages could draw in the future without violating the rights of any group that 
could offer serious resistance. 
     This is not to suggest that land pressure does not lead to warfare.  In fact, fighting 
occurring in Swat between Pukhtun landlords and their tenants is directly related to land 
pressure.  The Pukhtun, increasing in population, often wish to remove their tenants or to 
increase tenant rents.  The tenants, encouraged by a stress on tenants' rights under the 
mildly socialist regime of the Pakistan People's Party (which fell in 1977) now claim the 
land as their own.  The weakness of the military government in Swat has allowed tenant 
revolts in the region to persist, but this type of warfare between classes is new to Swat.  
Previous battles were between proud Pukhtun leaders who fought for lineage pride and 
prestige.  In this earlier form of war neither land nor property was permanently 
confiscated, and looting of produce was sporadic and not of great importance in terms of 
subsistence, as evidenced by the absence of reports of  hunger during intervillage wars. 
     In the past, there was another type of warfare which was much more destructive.  This 
was war between regions, and it grew from the same causes which led to intervillage war; 
that is, the exile of a group which then sought the intervention of an external third party 
to redress the balance of power.  In this case, the third party entering the fray was not 
simply another village, but another district.  In Swat, as I have argued elsewhere,xix the 
external third party was the State of Dir.  Dir ruled by hereditary kings, gladly provided 
sanctuary for Swati exiles.  Under favorable circumstances, the army of Dir would join 
with the exiles, invade Upper Swat, and establish rule there.  But Dir was not content 
simply to redress the balance.  The King of Dir wished to annex Swat, and began 
exploiting his victory by levying taxes and confiscating wealth.  The Pukhtun remember 
these invasions as times of severe scarcity and hunger.  Eventually, Dir's exactions led to 
an activation of the segmentary principle of unity against invasion.  The Swati parties 
united (usually under the leadership of a non-Pukhtun religious charismatic) in a war of 
resistance and Dir was driven out.  Three such wars are recorded in the past 150 years. 
     A final type of war, also destructive, involved expansion rather than defense.  For 
structural reasons, the segmentary lineage system is one which tends to expand at the 
expense of its less well organized neighbors.xx  The Pukhtun of Swat conquered their 
weaker neighbors to the north, the fierce Kohistani peoples.  This expansion ceased in the 
mid-1800s as the harshness of the terrain, the lack of booty, and the ferocity of the 
Kohistani resistance all combined to defeat the Pukhtun armies.  Pukhtun wars of 
aggression apparently were led by strong men anxious to raise their personal prestige and 
accumulate a following through leadership in battle and redistribution of spoils.  At this 
late date, it is difficult to discern exactly who followed such men, but it seems that great 
war leaders were temporarily able to unite fighting men of many different lineages in 
loose alliances brought together for the sake of conquest.  The secular leadership of 
expansionist warfare appears to be in marked contrast to leadership in wars of defense, 
which often arises from saintly lineages and relies upon religious exhortation to 
encourage resistance. 
      
CONCLUSION 
      
Violence in Swat is highly structured along several lines; the stress on revenge, the 
utilization of types of mediating bodies and leaders, and the scale of genealogical 
distance and corresponding physical propinquity of the rival elements.  Far from every 
genealogical level being a replica of every other, each more inclusive patrilineal segment 
has its own specific rules of violence for hostilities with segments of equal scale.  
Moreover, relations involving  revenge take precedence over other forms of violence and 
opposition, so that a death in a village party dispute dissolves the parties and leads to a 
personal vendetta between two nuclear families.  In intervillage wars, as well, murders by 
tarbur are avenged, while those by more distant enemies are not.  The formal patterning 
of revenge thus acts to restrict the range of feud and violence. 
     Behind the structuring of violence lies the Swati social order which focuses on the 
nuclear family as a relatively autonomous unit within the egalitarian structure of the 
segmentary lineage system.  The shifting dual parties superimposed over the triads of tul, 
palao, and clan reflect the reality of uneven development and the manipulation of 
alliances on the ground.  This system allows a great flexibility on the part of individual 
players.  Structural cohesion is maintained by the ties of blood and the obligation to 
revenge.  Though highly restricted, this obligation is the kernel of the social order, and 
provides the minimal stability necessary for system continuance. 
     Barth (1959a:84) notes that the range of blood responsibility was formerly wider, but 
has narrowed "in line with the general political trend whereby descent groups are losing 
their corporate political functions, and also with the legal principles exemplified in the 
courts of the neighboring administered territories."  Twenty-five years after Barth's 
fieldwork, revenge continues to be taken by the Pukhtun.  The problem is not the change 
of the system, but its persistence, despite the existence of law courts.  In fact, early in the 
reign of the local central government, death sentences were carried out by the nearest 
relative of the victim, thus satisfying both law and custom.  Revenge as a central cultural 
value cannot be understood through historical analysis or through efforts to find first 
causes.  Rather, a descriptive portrait of the Swati social order puts the revenge motif into 
its proper context and demonstrates its centrality within the total society. 
     Following Geertz (1973), I contend that the systematic description of social order has 
analytic value in that a pattern is postulated which has predictive power.  For example, 
during the 1977 national elections which were marred by serious bloodshed throughout 
Pakistan, it was possible to accurately predict that Swat would remain relatively peaceful 
due to the precedence of revenge over party.  It was also possible to predict that the 
Pukhtun vote in Swat would split in the traditional balanced opposition of the dullah.  
The model of individual manipulation within the system accounts for the shifting 
loyalties which characterize Swati politics, as well as for the long-term balance of the 
system, since alliances alter to level any overly powerful element.  The role of third 
parties as mediators, manipulators, and unreliable allies is also apparent in the model. 
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